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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

cessity" standard to permit reimbursement for good medical reasons
would increase the number of Medicaid funded abortions.3 6
By refusing to adopt a "medical necessity" standard, the court failed
to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim adequately. The Fourth Circuit improperly disregarded the plaintiff's claim that Title XIX required medically
necessary abortions to be funded under Virginia's Medicaid program. 7
Under the court's revised standard, the plaintiffs physical and emotional
problems might not be a substantial endangerment of health. The Fourth
Circuit's adoption of the "substantial endangerment of health" wording
has, in effect, left open the possiblity for a Title XIX challenge to the
Commonwealth's funding scheme similar to that presented in Doe v.
Kenley.s5
CHARLES JUSTER

V. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. PersonalLiability of Directors During CorporateDissolution
Many state legislatures have enacted statutes that require domestic
corporations to pay annual franchise taxes.1 To encourage compliance
with these statutes, 2 some states provide for corporate dissolution after
36 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S11,051 (daily ed. June 29, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke)
(discussion of medical necessity standard during Senate debates on Hyde Amendment).
37 Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1978).
36 See Medicaid, ABORTION L. RPTR. 1.14 (1979) (noting that "issue of Medicaid funding for 'medically necessary' abortions will ultimately be decided by Supreme Court"); note
27 supra.

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-114, 105-122 (1979); S.C. CODE § 12-19-70 (1976); VA.
CODE §§ 13.1-122, 58-456 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-78 (1974).
Franchise taxes, which are also referred to as license or registration fees, typically are calculated on the basis of the amount of a corporation's capital stock. See Note, Dissolution and
Suspension as Remedies for CorporateFranchiseTax Delinquency: A Comparative Analysis, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 602, 602 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Dissolution and Suspension];
see, e.g., VA. CODE § 58-456 (Cum. Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-78 (1974). Corporate
franchise tax statutes generally require the filing of annual reports in addition to the payment of the franchise taxes. See Comment, Suspension of Corporate Charterfor Nonpayment of Franchise Tax, 48 YALE L.J. 650, 650 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Suspension of
Corporate Charter];see, e.g., S.C. CODE § 33-25-10(a) (1976); VA. CODE § 13.1-120 (1978);
W. VA. CODE § 11-12-80 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Statutes that require domestic corporations to
file annual reports and pay franchise fees have the dual objectives of generating revenue and
exercising control over corporate affairs. Suspension of Corporate Charter,supra at 650-51.
Corporate compliance with state franchise tax statutes is essential because the proceeds from these statutes account for a significant portion of state revenue. See Dissolution
and Suspension, supra note 1, at 602-03.
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tax payments become delinquent.3 Many of these states also have
reinstatement statutes which allow dissolved corporations to be revived
by payment of the delinquent franchise taxes. 4 Unless a dissolved
corporation has been reinstated, franchise tax dissolution statutes
typically require that the corporation cease doing business and proceed to
liquidate the corporate assets.3 Whether directors and officers who
continue the normal operations of a dissolved corporation may be held
personally liable for corporate obligations incurred during the period of
dissolution is an issue which occasionally arises.
In Moore v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
the Fourth Circuit recently addressed the issue of the personal liability of
directors and officers during periods of corporate dissolution. The Moore
court interpreted the Virginia dissolution statute which does not
expressly provide that dissolution for failure to pay corporate franchise
taxes will result in the personal liability of officers and directors who
continue normal operations after statutory dissolution. 7 The Virginia
3 See, e.g., N.C. CODE §§ 55-114(a)(4), 105-230 (1975 & 1979); S.C. CODE § 33-21110(a)(2) (1976); VA. CODE § 13.1-91 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-86 (1974). During periods
of financial stress, a corporation is likely to delay payment of the franchise tax in favor of
other operating obligations. See Suspension of Corporate Charter,supra note 1, at 651. See
generally Swearingen, CorporationsWhose Charters Have Become Void, 16 MICH. ST. B.J.
149 (1937).
4 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-232 (1979); S.C. CODE § 33-21-120 (1976); VA. CODE §
13.1-92 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-86 (1974).
5 See, e.g., TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 122A, § 12.14(2) (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-91
(1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.40.075 (Supp. 1978). W. VA. CODE § 11-12-86 (1974)
provides that any person attempting to exercise corporate powers after the governor's proclamation of delinquency will be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.
6 591 F.2d 991 (4th Cir. 1978).
See id. at 994; VA. CODE § 13.1-91 (1978). Although the Virginia dissolution statute
provides that the Virginia State Corporation Commission should notify a delinquent corporation of impending dissolution, the statute expressly requires automatic dissolution of a
delinquent corporation, regardless of whether such notice is given. Id. Most states which
provide for corporate dissolution due to franchise tax delinquency, however, effectuate dissolution through administrative action rather than by automatic statutory dissolution. See 8
CAVITCH, BusiaNss ORGANIZATIONS § 187.02 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CAVITCH]. Typically,
the Secretary of State forfeits the corporate charter by administrative declaration when corporate franchise taxes are overdue. Id.; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-230 (1979); S.C.
CODE § 33-21-110(b) (1976). Forfeiture of the corporate charter and corporate dissolution or
suspension are functionally equivalent terms which indicate that an organization's right to
do business as a corporation is revoked by the state. See Dissolution and Suspension, supra
note 1, at 603-05; Suspension of Corporate Charter,supra note 1, at 651-52. At common
law, dissolution terminates a corporation's legal existence, while forfeiture or suspension
does not affect the basic entity because the corporation may be reinstated, instead of reincorporated, upon payment of delinquent taxes. See Dissolution and Suspension, supra
note 2, at 603-04. Although VA. CODE § 13.1-91 (1978) provides for corporate "dissolution,"
the result of the statute is suspension of corporate powers because VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (1979)
allows for reinstatement. See Dissolution and Suspension, supra note 1, at 603-04; Suspension of Corporate Charter,supra note 1, at 650-51. In addition to the ability of a "dissolved" corporation in Virginia to be reinstated, state law allows a dissolved corporation to
sue in its corporate name. VA. CODE § 13.1-101 (1978).
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dissolution statute simply provides that failure to payofranchise taxes for
two consecutive years will result in automatic dissolution, with the former
directors, as trustees, ordered to liquidate the organization's assets.8 The
Fourth Circuit in Moore also interpreted the Virginia reinstatement
statute9 which allows a dissolved corporation to be revived upon payment
of the delinquent taxes and penalties. 10 Reinstatement under the Virginia
statute causes the corporate existence to relate back to the time of
dissolution, except that reinstatement will have no effect on any personal
liability of the directors or officers which may have arisen during the
period between dissolution and reinstatement. 1
In Moore, a Virginia corporation, Life Science, Inc., was dissolved for
failure to pay franchise taxes as required by state law. 2 Although the
state gave Life Science notification of dissolution, the appellants,
managing officers and directors of the corporation, continued the firm's
normal operations. 3 Two months after Life Science was dissolved, the
corporation was revived under the reinstatement statute." Pursuant to
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),' 5 an inspector
from the Department of Labor found safety violations which had
occurred at the Life Science manufacturing plant during the period
between corporate dissolution and reinstatement.16 The Secretary of
Labor consequently issued a fine payable by both the corporation and the
appellants as individuals.' 7 The appellants contested their fine before an
a VA. CODE § 13.1-91 (1978). The former directors of a corporation dissolved for failure
to pay franchise taxes must discharge the corporation's outstanding liabilities and distribute
the remainder of the assets to the shareholders. Id.
8 VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (1978).
10 591 F.2d at 995; VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (1978). A Virginia corporation dissolved pursuant
to § 13.1-91 may be reinstated within five years after dissolution upon payment of delinquent taxes and penalties. Id.
"

VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (1978).

12 591

F.2d at 992.

13 Id. In a letter sent by the State Corporation Commission, the Life Science directors

were advised that they could be held personally liable for contracts purportedly made in the
name of the corporation. Id.
14

Id.

U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979). Due to the indreasing number of
disabling work injuries, Congress passed OSHA which requires employers to prevent unsafe
or unhealthy working conditions. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1977). See generally Comment, The Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 4 CuM.-SAm. L. REv. 525 (1974).
Is 591 F.2d at 992-93. Life Science, which manufactured the pesticide Kepone, was
charged with failure to maintain a place of employment free from recognized hazards. Brief
for Appellee at 4, Moore v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 591 F.2d 991
(4th Cir. 1979); see 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1) (1976). See generally Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 444-47 (1977) (statement of OSHA
enforcement procedures); Moran, The Legal Processfor the Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 9 GONz. L. REv. 349 (1974).
27 591 F.2d at 992-93. The appellants conceded the liability of the corporation and con"' 28
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administrative law judge.' The judge held the corporate officers and
directors personally liable, reasoning that during the period that Life
Science was dissolved, the appellants continued to operate the business as
partners and, therefore, were the employers responsible for the OSHA
penalties.' 9 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(Commission)20 subsequently upheld the administrative law judge's
imposition of personal liability despite appellants' contention that they
had no knowledge of the dissolution.2 1
On appeal from the Commission's decision, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that the Virginia dissolution statute imposed personal liability on the
appellants because they continued the normal operations of Life Science
instead of liquidating the corporation as required by law. 22 The Moore
court concluded that individual liability must attach directly to corporate
officers and directors, reasoning that corporate existence is completely
extinguished after dissolution. 2 After finding that the appellants were
personally liable under the Virginia dissolution statute for the OSHA
penalties, the Fourth Circuit decided that revival of the corporation
under Virginia's reinstatement statute did not absolve the appellants of
liability for the penalties. " ' While the court noted that the reinstatement
statute provides that corporate existence relates back to the date of
dissolution, the court applied the statutory provision that reinstatement
will not affect any personal liability of the directors or officers arising
during the period between dissolution and reinstatement. 25 Thus, the
Moore court held the appellants personally liable regardless of their
2 s
alleged ignorance of the dissolution.
tested only whether the Secretary of Labor could impose personal liability on appellants for
the OSHA penalty. Id. at 993.
" The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission appoints an administrative
law judge to review an OSHA citation which an employer has contested. 29 U.S.C. § 661(i)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); see K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 10 (1976).
19 591 F.2d at 993. An "employer" under the Act is defined as a person engaged in
business affecting commerce who has employees. 29 U.S.C. § 652(4) (1976). A "person" includes individuals as well as corporations. Id. See also Brennan v. Gillen & Cotting, Inc.,
504 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974) (common law definition of "employer" rejected under
OSHA).
20 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, at its discretion, may review the decision of an administrative law judge regarding an OSHA citation. 29 U.S.C. §
661(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
21 591 F.2d at 993. Because the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
could not agree on whether to affirm or reverse the decision of the administration law judge,
the Commission decided to affirm the judge's ruling without the precedential value of a
Commission decision. Id.; Brief for Appellants at 4, Moore v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 591 F.2d 991 (4th Cir. 1974).
22 591 F.2d at 995.
23 Id., citing Gusky, Dissolution, Forfeiture, and Liquidiation of Virginia Corporations, 12 U. RIcH. L. REv. 333, 346 (1978).
24 591 F.2d at 995.
25 Id. at 995-96; see text accompanying note 11 supra.
26 591 F.2d at 996.
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in Moore is consistent with the plain
meaning of the Virginia statutory provisions. The Virginia reinstatement
27
statute, which operates in conjunction with the dissolution statute,
clearly acknowledges the possibility that corporation dissolution due to
failure to pay the annual franchise tax may result in the personal liability
of former directors or officers if they continue to operate, rather than
liquidate, the corporation.2 8 If the Virginia legislature did not intend to
impose personal liability on directors and officers after corporate
dissolution, the statutory provision that reinstatement will have no effect
on personal liability would be surplusage. 29 The Moore court also
properly rejected the appellants' claim that their ignorance of the
dissolution must absolve them of personal liability. Neither the
dissolution nor the reinstatement statute exempts from personal liability
corporate officials who inadvertently continue the normal operations of a
dissolved corporation while unaware of the dissolution."0
Although the Fourth Circuit reached the correct result in Moore, the
reasoning employed by the court is questionable. The Fourth Circuit's
rationale of a dissolved corporation being non-existent is consistent with
the common law rule that an agent acting on behalf of a non-existent
principal is personally liable on any obligations incurred in the name of
the principal."' Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit should have viewed the
personal liability provision in the reinstatement statute as evidence of a
controlling legislative intent that the continuation of normal operations
after statutory dissolution would result in the personal liability of the
firm's officers and directors. 3 2 The Fourth Circuit's emphasis on Life
'7 See VA. CODE § 13.1-92 (1978) (specifically referring to § 13.1-91).
28 See CAVITCH, supra note 8, § 187.02 n.8 (interpreting Virginia's reinstatement statute
as providing retroactive corporate existence to dissolution date in addition to maintaining
personal liability of corporate directors and officers). A Delaware court interpreted the Delaware reinstatement statute, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 312 (1974), as expressly eliminating the personal liability for the president of a corporation that was dissolved and subsequently reinstated. Frederick G. Krapf & Son, Inc. v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713, 715 (Del. 1968).
29 See Ex Parte the Public Nat'l Bank, 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928) (provision in statute
can not be ignored as superfluous).
30 See VA. CODE §§ 13.1-91 to -92 (1978). The legislative history to § 13.1-92 indicates
that the Virginia legislature intended § 13.1-92 to apply in cases of negligent failure to pay
the franchise tax. See House Document No. 5 at 77, General Assembly of Virginia (1956
Sess.). VA. CODE § 13.1-132 (1978) authorizes the use of House Documents to interpret state
statutes.
31 See, e.g., In re Hare, 205 F. Supp. 881, 883-84 (D. Md. 1962); Norton v. Supreme
Fuel Sales Co., 72 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D.N.J. 1947); Jones v. Young, 115 W. Va. 225, 228, 174
S.E. 885, 886 (1934). The Hare court acknowledged that a corporation dissolved for failure

to pay franchise taxes may be considered as an "existing" corporation when necessary to
protect the rights of third persons. 205 F. Supp. at 883. The court, however, denied the
protection of the corporation where it would be unconscionable to insulate them from personal liability. Id. at 884.

2 The intent of the legislature must control the interpretation of Virginia statutory
law. See City of Portsmouth v. Citizens Trust Co., 216 Va. 695, 699, 222 S.E.2d 532, 535
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Science's corporate non-existence is also inappropriate because the
court's reasoning is inconsistent with an earlier Fourth Circuit decision 3
which ruled that under the reinstatement statute a dissolved corporation
has a qualified existence from which the corporation could achieve revival
without any new grant from the state.3 4 To avoid conceptual confusion,
reliance on legislative intent in Moore would have been preferable to a
decision based on whether a Virginia corporation
"exists" after
35
dissolution due to failure to pay franchise taxes.
The Moore decision is significant since it interprets Virginia's
dissolution and reinstatement statutes as mandating personal liability for
managing officers and directors who continue the normal operations of a
corporation dissolved due to failure to pay franchise taxes.3 8 The Moore
opinion highlights the need for careful attention to the annual payment
of corporate franchise taxes as negligent delinquency
may result in
37
personal liability of corporate directors and officers.
JAMES S. McNIDER,

I

B. The Constitutionality of the Virginia Motor Vehicle FranchiseAct
The vast disparity in bargaining power between automobile manufacturers and their franchise dealers has long been recognized as a matter of
grave concern. 1 The concentration of economic power in the automobile
manufacturing industry has imposed unfair and inequitable conditions of
trade upon franchises.2 In 1956, Congress passed the Automobile Dealers'
(1976); Board of Super. v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 147, 216 S.E.2d 199, 214 (1975).
33 United States v. Village Corp., 298 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962).
34 Id. at 818. The Village court held that a corporation dissolved for failure to pay
franchise taxes "existed" under § 13.1-92 and thus was amenable to suit because of the
possibility of reinstatement. Id. at 818-20.
36 See note 32 supra.
31 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
37 See text accompanying note 26 supra.

1 See S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4596, 4597 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See generally S. MACAULEY, LAW

(1966);
Macauley, Law and Society-Changinga Continuing RelationshipBetween a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal with It: Automobile Manufacturers, their Dealers and the
Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 483.
2 See HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4598. Automobile dealers have reported that they
have been forced to accept more automobiles for resale than required by consumer demand.
Further, the dealers have claimed that the manufacturers have required investments in operating plant and equipment without giving franchisees adequate guarantees that a sufficient supply of merchandise will be available. Id. An automobile dealer who invests in a
franchise is economically.dependent on the automobile manufacturer because of the franchisee's inability to convert the dealership facilities to other uses. SENATE REPORT, supra
AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS
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Day in Court Acts which requires that automobile manufacturers deal
with their franchised dealers in good faith.4 Virginia has supplemented
the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act with the passage of the Motor
Vehicle Franchise Act (Franchise Act), which permits a franchised dealer

to contest the establishment of an additional, like-kind dealership in the
same trade area.6 The purpose of the Franchise Act is to protect the investment of the franchised dealer and to preserve competition.7 The

Franchise Act provides that the Commissioner of the Division of Motor
Vehicles may enjoin the establishment of a new automobile franchise if
the Commissioner determines that the market will not support multiple
dealerships of the same line-make in a given trade area.8 In American
Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles,9 the Virginia Franchise

Act was challenged as imposing an unconstitutional burden on interstate
0
1

commerce.
In American Motors, an existing Jeep dealership in Orange, Virginia,
requested a hearing under the Franchise Act after receiving notice that

American Motors (American) intended to establish an additional Jeep
note 1, at 2. Unless the dealership can generate a sufficient volume of sales, the franchise
will be unable to cover fixed costs. See generally B. PASHIGAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYsis (1960).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976). See generally Strand & French, The Automobile
Dealer Franchise Act: Another Experiment in Federal Class Legislation, 25 G. WASH. L.
REV. 667 (1957).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976). The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act provides automobile dealers with a federal cause of action for a manufacturer's failure to act in good faith
when performing, terminating, or not renewing the franchise. See id. See also Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir. 1976).
5 VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Congress has sanctioned state legislation
that supplements the Dealers' Day in Court Act unless the state statute directly conflicts
with the federal act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1976).
' See VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under the Virginia Franchise Act, the
existing franchise must protest within thirty days of receiving notification that the manufacturer intends to establish another franchise in the same line-make of the existing dealership.
Id. Other states have adopted statutes similar to the Virginia Franchise Act. See, e.g., ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-6-120(1) (h) (1973);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-6610 (e)(5)-(e)(10) (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.4 (Supp.
1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1422 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-37-5(P) (Supp. 1975); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4(C)(11) (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS §§ 32-6A-3, 32-6A-4 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(C) (20) (Supp. 1979);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(c)(9) (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).

See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1966).
7 See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Veh., 592 F.2d 219, 222 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 71 (1979).
a VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). In a hearing pursuant to the Virginia
Franchise Act, the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles must consider a
number of specific factors, including the volume of the existing dealer, the extent of the
dealer's investment, the adequacy of the dealer's service facilities and the effect on the community of the proposed prohibition of an additional franchise. Id.
' 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979).
10 Id. at 221.
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franchise in Orange.1 The hearing officer for the Division of Motor Vehicles ruled that the additional franchise was permissible because the ex-

isting dealership had not offered sufficient evidence to prove that the Orange trade area could not support two Jeep dealerships." The
Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles, however, rejected the
conclusion of the hearing officer and prohibited American from granting
an additional Jeep franchise.' 3
American subsequently sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that the Franchise Act violated the commerce clause.' 4 American alleged that the company had lost substantial interstate sales of Jeep
vehicles as a direct result of the Commissioner's decision.' 5 The district
court in American Motors declared the Virginia Franchise Act unconstitutional, reasoning that the preservation of competition is not a legitimate local purpose under the commerce clause.' 6 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court and ruled that the Virginia Franchise
Act did not violate the commerce clause. 17 The Fourth Circuit addressed
the commerce clause issue by utilizing a three part test.'8 The court first
inquired whether the Franchise Act promotes a legitimate local interest.1 '
Second the court analyzed whether the Virginia statute treated interstate
and intrastate commerce evenhandedly. 20 Lastly, the Fourth Circuit ad1 Id.
11 Id. at 221-22. At the hearing the existing franchised dealer argued that the depressed
local economy and the area's slow population growth caused the dealership's sales performance to drop below the minimum sales requirement specified in its franchise contract with
American. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Veh., 445 F. Supp. 902, 908
(E.D. Va. 1978). American responded that the existing dealership's minimum sales requirement had been calculated in a manner consistent with that used nationwide. Id.
" 592 F.2d at 222; see note 15 infra.
14 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause acts as a limitation on state economic regulation in addition to being an affirmative grant of power to Congress "[tlo regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes." See id.; H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949). See generally
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. RE V. 1 (1940); Schwartz, CoMMERC., THE STATES AND THE BURGER COURT, 74 Nw. L. REv. 409 (1979); Tushnet, Rethinking
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125.
16 445 F. Supp. at 904. American did not contend that the decision of the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles was arbitrary or based on insufficient evidence. 592 F.2d at 222 n.3.
I6 592 F.2d at 222. Although the district court ruled that the prevention of unfair trade
practices was a legitimate local purpose, the court decided that this purpose could be accomplished with a lesser burden on interstate commerce than that imposed by the
Franchise Act. 445 F. Supp. at 907-10.
17 592 F.2d at 224.
8 The three part test employed by the American Motors court was established in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), as a standard for determining the validity of
a state statute challenged under the commerce clause. See also Raymond Motor Trans., Inc.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-42 (1978); Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea. Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,
371-72 (1976).
9 592 F.2d at 222.

20

Id.
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dressed whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce appears excessive when balanced against the state's interest in preventing unfair
business practices.2
The American Motors court ruled that the Virginia Franchise Act
promotes a legitimate local interest and treats intrastate and interstate
commerce in an evenhanded manner.22 The court relied on the Supreme
recent decision in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox
Court's
2
Co.

3

which determined that a California franchise act similar to the Vir-

ginia statute was constitutional under due process and Sherman Act challenges.24 The Fourth Circuit adopted the Orrin Court's characterization
of the California franchise statute and found that the Virginia Franchise
Act also serves the legitimate purpose of protecting automobile dealerships from unfair business practices.2 5 Further, the American Motors
court ruled that the Franchise Act treats intrastate and interstate automobile manufacturers in a non-discriminatory manner, explaining that
the Virginia statute does not distinguish between in-state and out-ofstate manufacturers.28 Therefore, the court concluded that the Franchise
Act does not discriminate against interstate commerce."
The Fourth Circuit next determined that the Virginia statute does not
impose a burden on interstate commerce. 28 The American Motors court
29
In
followed the leading case of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.

Exxon, the Supreme Court held that interstate commerce is not burdened
simply because a state statute has the effect of shifting business from one
31 Id.
22 Id.
23

at 223.

439 U.S. 96 (1978).

24 Id. at 106, 109-10. In Orrin, the appellants alleged that the California Automobile
Franchise Act, CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3062-3063 (West Supp. 1978), violated the due process

clause of the Constitution and the Sherman Act. 439 U.S. at 106, 109-10. The claims in
Orrin were designed to overturn California's statutory scheme whereby the timely protest of
an existing franchisee could delay the establishment of a like-kind dealership before a
hearing could be held. Id. at 104. The appellants, who included General Motors, argued that
due process was violated because they could be prohibited from establishing a franchise
until a hearing was held. Id. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the appellants' argument, holding that the California legislature could enact reasonable business regulation even
though the regulation might delay the establishment of a dealership ultimately determined
to be legitimate. Id. at 106. The Orrin Court also rejected appellants' Sherman Act claim,
explaining that. the California franchise statute was a clearly expressed regulatory scheme

that falls under the "state action" exception to the antitrust laws. Id. at 109. Many California dealers have admitted privately that protests under the state's automobile franchise
statute were filed to gain a competitive advantage and that dealers did not intend to take

their protest to the hearing stage. See Melican, State Franchise Law Developments, 47
ANTrRUST L.J. 929, 936-37 (1978).

"' 592 F.2d at 222-23.
26 Id. at 223.
27

Id.

28Id.

29 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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interstate supplier to another.8 0 The Fourth Circuit thus found the
Franchise Act constitutional, reasoning that any lost Jeep sales the statute caused would inure to the benefit of the other out-of-state manufacturers of four-wheel drive vehicles. 3' The American Motors court therefore found no burden on interstate commerce because the commerce
clause is designed to protect the interstate market, rather than particular
8 2
interstate corporations.
The Fourth Circuit properly ruled that the Virginia Franchise Act
treated intrastate and interstate commerce on an evenhanded basis. The
franchise statute is facially non-discriminatory and there was no showing
that the act effectively discriminated against interstate commerce.33 The
Fourth Circuit, however, did not need to decide whether the Virginia
statute serves a legitimate local interest.3 4 A state statute's legitimate
purpose need be considered only if the statute burdens interstate commerce; otherwise, the required nexus between the statute and interstate
commerce is missing.33 In American Motors, the court did not find that
the Franchise Act burdened interstate commerce.36 Rather, the Fourth
Circuit indicated that, while sales may shift from Jeep to its competitors,
1o

Id. at 127. The Maryland statute attacked under the commerce clause in Exxon pro-

vided that petroleum refiners could not operate retail service stations in the state. Id. at
123; MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (1979). The Supreme Court rejected discrimination
claims because the Maryland statute did not distinguish between out-of-state and in-state
firms. Id. at 121. The Court also rejected the claim that the effect of the statute would be to
unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. Id. at 127. The Exxon Court found no evidence that the flow of gasoline into the state would decrease, reasoning that if some suppliers withdrew from the Maryland market, other suppliers arguably would replace the gasoline ordinarily sold by the former sellers. Id. at 123 n.10. That a state statute causes a
burden on an individual firm's sales is irrelevant so long as the aggregate flow of interstate
commerce is not restricted. Id. at 127.
31

592 F.2d at 223.

32

Id.

at 223; accord Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. at 127-28; see note

30 supra.
31 See 592 F.2d at 223; VA. CODE 46.1-547(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). A statute which expressly discriminates against out-of-state firms or which favors local business at the expense
of out-of-state business will be found to violate the commerce clause unless a legitimate
local interest is furthered by the statute and the means chosen is the least discriminatory
alternative. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-53 (1977);
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HAuv. L. REv. 57,
66 (1978). In Hunt, the Court struck down a North Carolina law that benefited the state's
apple growers to the detriment of Washington state apple growers. 432 U.S. at 350-53.
" See Detroit Auto. Purch. Services, Inc. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. 954, 962 (D. Md. 1978);
text accompanying note 35 infra.
11 Detroit Auto. Purch. Services, Inc. v. Lee, 463 F. Supp. at 962. The Lee court refused
to examine the interests protected by a state statute since the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the statute inhibited the aggregate flow of goods in interstate commerce. 463 F.
Supp. at 964 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125-29); see note
30 supra.
3" 592 F.2d at 223.
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there was no evidence presented which established that the Franchise Act
the aggregate flow of interstate sales of four-wheel drive
restricted
37

vehicles.

The result in American Motors is consistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions that refuse to invalidate state economic legislation on
substantive due process grounds.3 8 Absent a violation of a specific constitutional prohibition, the court has presumed that state regulations proscribing undesirable business activity are valid. s9 Thus, a successful attempt to override the Franchise Act on substantive due process grounds
seems unlikely.'0
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in American Motors clearly suggests that
state automobile franchise statutes comparable to the Virginia act cannot
be invalidated under the commerce clause unless there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Franchise Act restricts the aggregate flow of
goods entering a state. 1 Given the complexity of documenting cause and
effect in our economy, these franchise statutes may continue to be upheld. Recently, courts in Massachusetts and California have held that
franchise acts similar to the Virginia enactment are constitutional under
the commerce clause.42 The Fourth Circuit's decision in American Motors
37See id.
See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89
(1955); Preston & Mehiman, The Due ProcessClause as a Limitation on the Reach of State
Legislation: An Historicaland Analytical Examination of Substantive Due Process, 8 U.
BALT. L. REv. 1, 31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Preston & Mehiman]. In Exxon, the Court
rejected a claim that a Maryland statute violated substantive due process, explaining that
the due process clause does not allow the Court to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of state legislation. 117 U.S. at 124-25. Substantive due process refers to the principle that a statute which deprives an individual of his life, liberty or property is invalid, even
though the law does not violate a specific constitutional provision. Perry, Substantive Due
Process Revisited: Reflections On (And Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. L. REv. 417, 419
(1976).
'3 See Preston & Mehlman, supra note 38, at 31, 37; Note, State Economic Substantive
Due Process:A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L. J. 1487, 1487 n.4 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as A Proposed Approach]; note 38 supra. The Supreme Court has not struck down a state
economic regulation on substantive due process grounds since 1937. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrruUONAL LAW 591 (9th ed. 1975); A Proposed Approach, supra at 1487 n.4.
40 See notes 38 & 39 supra.
41 See 592 F.2d at 223; note 30 supra.
42 See Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr.
135 (Ct. App. 1979); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., - Mass. -, 381
N.E.2d 908 (1978). But see General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373,
237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977). Both Chrysler and Tober relied on Exxon
v. Governor of Maryland, see note 26 supra, to reject claims under the commerce clause,
explaining that no evidence indicated that the respective franchise statutes would cause a
reduction of the aggregate flow of interstate commerce. See 89 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 140-41; - Mass. at -, 381 N.E.2d at 914-15; CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3000-3069 (West
Supp. 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(e)(1) (West Supp. 1979). The Chrysler
court further explained that any vehicle sales lost by one manufacturer because of the stat38

